

Cyber Insider Training for Radiological Sources Instructor Guide This page intentionally left blank

Time Allotte	d: 1 hour
Instructional Method	s: Presentation, Discussion
Information Release N	D. LLNL-PRES-831032


Module Overview and Instructor Guidance

Instructor responsibilities:	• This module is delivered in a <i>classroom setting.</i>	
	 Instructors are responsible for obtaining site/country specific information including what equipment is being deployed/used and coming prepared to train on that equipment. 	
	• Verify that participants have received all necessary supplies and equipment needed to complete this training as listed below.	
	 Instructor-led facilitation is scheduled for 1 hour. 	
	Activity: N/A	
Evaluation opportunities:		
Safety briefing:	Remind participants of the general safety, emergency egress information, and any other safety related information required by the site.	
Course materials, training aids, and supplemental	Instructor Guide	
	Participant Guide	
materials:	PowerPoint file	
	 Instructor laptop, tablet, or desktop computer 	

Cyber Insider Training for Radiological Sources

Good afternoon, everyone and thank you for joining me in this training session. Today, we are going to be gaining some Cyber Insider Training for Radiological Sources.

Introduce instructors and students.






Greg White (LLNL) Mike Rowland (SNLA) Leah McLeod (PNNL) February 11, 2022 LLNL-PRES-831032

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Module 1

Basics and Incidents

Let's talk about the basics of the insider threat and several examples of insiders and their effect on the organizations.




Cyber Insider Training for Radiological Sources

Module 1 Basics and Incidents

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Topics

Let's talk about how cyber security is affected by the insider attack and how we can protect against it. We will also discuss several realworld examples of cyber insiders and their effect on their organizations.



Cyber Insiders

- Motives were often highly personal and were related to problems that the employees were facing when they decided to exploit or sabotage the organization's information systems.
- Some insiders were under financial stress and used the information systems to embezzle funds or access proprietary information that they then sold to competitors.



- Other insiders felt unappreciated for their work and wanted to prove their expertise by creating a cyber breach that they then solved.
- And in other cases, the employee was facing discipline or termination and wanted to embarrass the organization or ruin its brand reputation.

The Unwitting Insider

CHASE C

· Opening a malicious email attachment

· Following instructions of a social engineer

Plugging-in an unknown thumb driveVisiting a malicious website

The Unwitting Insider

- In most cases, the insider knows that his actions are causing damage to the facility and is deliberate.
- However, with cyber there is the unwitting insider. They support the malicious act without knowing the potential damage of their actions.
- The user may open a document attached to their email, visit a malicious website, or insert a USB thumb drive into their computer that they found dropped into the parking lot. Any of these may install malicious software on their system. They don't intend to cause damage to the facility, but the result is the same.



Maroochy Australia Sewage Treatment

Let's look at another example. Vitek Boden worked for a contractor that installed and operated a sewage system in an area of about 70 cities in Australia. He had a disagreement with his company and quit. He then tried to get the local government to hire him directly to perform the same job. When they didn't hire him, their sewage system started malfunctioning. Sewage was spilled, causing Maroochy Australia Sewage Treatment
Maroochy Australia (an area of about 70 cities) has a sewage system with 142 pumps
Vitek Boden worked for a company that installed the control system
He resigned from his company (after a disagreement with his bosses), then he tried to convince the local government to have him work directly for them, but they declined
The sewer system started breaking regularly
200,000 gallons of sewage leaked into the environment
This turned the river black, killed fish and wildlife, and destroyed nature reserves
Experts looking at the problems and initially thought it was normal equipment failures
Despite new equipment, failures continued

large amounts of environmental damage. Experts were hired and initially thought the problems were just equipment failures. They replaced equipment, but the system kept failing.

References:


https://malicious.life/episode/episode-7-stuxnet-part-1/ [The Maroochy Incident]

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker jailed for revenge sewage/

https://cams.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017-09.pdf

Maroochy Australia Sewage Treatment (continued)

Then, late one night, one of the experts reconfigured a pump, but another pump changed the configuration back. This seemed odd. He renumbered the pump that had changed the configuration, but the network traffic indicated the bad pump was still reconfiguring other pumps. This indicated some kind of network breach. Vitek Boden was identified as a suspect and they hired



someone to follow him. He was found near one of the pumping stations with a laptop and a wireless radio. The laptop had a pirated version of the control software installed on it. They found he had made at least 46 attempts to take control of the sewage system. He was convicted and sentenced for his crimes.

References:

https://malicious.life/episode/episode-7-stuxnet-part-1/ [The Maroochy Incident]


https://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/

https://cams.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017-09.pdf

Module 2

Cyber Incident Response Walkthrough

In the next module, we'll walk through a cybersecurity incident from the perspective of the hypothetical facility being attacked.





Module 2 Cyber Incident Response Walkthrough

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Topics

Here is a list of the major topics we are going to discuss in this module. We start with familiarizing you with the hypothetical facility. We'll then walk through the incident, discussing each step along the way. Finally, we'll then discuss the overall incident.



Country of Anshar Overview

Anshar is a hypothetical country. They have a full set of state organizations, from a nuclear regulator, a cybersecurity organization, a federal law enforcement organization, and an intelligence service. There are three primary facilities. A regional hospital with radiation sources, a nuclear power plant, and a nuclear research institute.

<section-header><section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item> • State Organizations • State Organizations • Anshar Atomic Energy Agency • Anshar Computer Emergency Response
team (CERT) • Anshar Republic Federal Police • State Intelligence Services • Licensees • Gula Regional Hospital • Ashara Nuclear Power Plant • Shapash Nuclear Research Institute

Gula Hospital Physical Security

- Arrangement with local law enforcement has one police officer on premises 24/7
- Also, one unarmed security contractor is on premises 24/7 to assist law enforcement
- Rooms that contain the blood irradiator and the teletherapy unit are in the basement
- Gula Hospital Physical Security · One law enforcement officer on premises 24/7 One unarmed security contractors is on premises 24/7 to assist law enforcement • The blood irradiator and the teletherapy unit are in the basement Access to basement is unrestricted, but access to Teletheran blood irradiator and teletherapy rooms is controlled **Hospital Basement** insiderthreatmitigation.org
- Access to basement is unrestricted, but access to blood irradiator and teletherapy rooms is controlled

Reference: IAEA Hypothetical State Facility


Gula Hospital Networks

There are four networks at Gula

Green – Complimentary Guest Wi-Fi to be used by patients and staff. No password required.

Purple – Hospital staff Wi-Fi for Gula personnel to conduct communications throughout the hospital. Password required

Green and Purple are supported by the same network infrastructure (routers/switches) separated by VLANs.



Red – Fire and Safety wired network. Enables fire sensors and life monitoring devices to communicate with nurse station.

Blue – Physical Protection System (PPS) wired network. Blue network runs throughout Gula. Endpoints are cameras, sensors, door controls, etc. and report to Central Alarm Station

Reference: IAEA Hypothetical State Facility

Gula Hospital Cybersecurity Program

Gula has a basic Cybersecurity Program. The head of security is responsible for the cybersecurity program. An initial inventory and risk assessment has been completed but hasn't been updated. There is no incident response team and there are no response and recovery procedures. There is a staff cybersecurity awareness training program.

Gula Hospital Cybersecurity Program

- Gula has implemented a basic cybersecurity program
- Head of Security is the person responsible for the cybersecurity program
- Computer inventory and risk assessment documents have not been updated
- The hospital does not have cybersecurity incident response team or any response or recovery procedures
- All hospital staff must undergo cybersecurity awareness training.



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Gula Hospital Computer Support

Gula staff do basic computer administration and cybersecurity hygiene, but anything more complicated than that are done by on-site contractors or external contractors.

Gula Hospital Computer Support

- Basic Tasks are performed by Gula staff
 Cybersecurity hygiene and administration tasks
- Intermediate Tasks are performed by on-site contractors
- Troubleshooting, Repairs, Backup, Log monitoring
 Advanced Tasks are performed by external
- contractorsForensics



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9am Monday

- A cloud provider in Anshar calls Head of Security
 - One of the machines hosted by the cloud provider has been used in the conduct of a cyber-attack campaign targeting key organizations significant to Anshar's national security

9am Monday

- A cloud provider in Anshar notifies the head of security of a cyber-attack campaign targeting key organizations in Anshar
 - Encrypted data was sent to one of their machines from an IP address registered to the Gula Hospital
- Cloud provider sends an email detailing the:
 Suspect IP address
 - IP address of the hospital system on the Guest network Dates and times of transmissions for past 30 days
- Size of transmissions are 5KB 10MB each, about 100MB total





- insiderthreatmitigation.org
- Encrypted data was sent to this machine from an IP address registered to Gula's guest network
- · Cloud provider sends an email detailing the:
 - Suspect IP address at the cloud provider
 - Hospital IP address (from the Guest Network)
 - Dates and times of transmissions for past 30 days
 - Size of transmissions are 5KB 10MB each, about 100MB total
 - · Further information will be provided later

10am Monday

The head of security decides this is a critical problem and he should convene an incident response team. But he doesn't have one already setup, so this will have to be ad hoc, for now.

10am Monday



- The Head of Security has determined that immediate response is necessary
- An incident response team and recovery plan must be developed to fill the existing gap

Who should be on this team?




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11am Monday

The head of security assembles the incident response team, made up of hospital staff. He leads the meeting and talks about each member's roles and responsibilities.

There are lots of things we don't know right now. The cloud provider can't tell us what kind of information was exfiltrated since it was encrypted. It's on the guest wireless network, so we aren't sure if one of our devices was



compromised. We also don't know what the attacker was trying to accomplish.

We also don't have information about our networks and devices that would help the investigation. Some of the information we have lacks the details we need.

9am Tuesday

The incident response team has gone off and found out what information sources they could acquire.

We have network diagrams that include our defensive architecture, risk scenarios with consequences, and a list of our most important assets.


We also have several logs. We have network

9am Tuesday The incident response team assembles for a second meeting Information sources that are available, acquirable, and valuable are: List of network drawings; including defensive architecture specification Risk registry/scenarios associated with consequences List of most valuable assets Network logs (30 days) IT system logs (variable periods) PPS host logs (90 days) Which source should be prioritized?

logs for 30 days, IT system logs for different time periods and physical protection system host logs for 90 days.

9am Thursday

By looking at the logs, we've found some interesting traffic. This was early in the attack and isn't the encrypted data that the cloud provider found. Basically, the attackers weren't as careful as they should have been this early in the attack. They sent some unencrypted web/http traffic which implies the transfer of sensitive information and passwords from the physical protection system (PPS) via the guest wireless network.




But the two networks aren't connected to each other. This is called an air gap.

So how did this data from the PPS network get to the guest wireless network?

1pm Thursday

- The team has found an unauthorized raspberry pi connected to the physical security wired network. A raspberry pi is a credit card sized standalone computer. It has a Wi-Fi device.
- The device was found in a locked panel within the central alarm station. Access to this area is strictly controlled and only authorized staff and contractors are allowed.



The head of security calls an urgent incident response meeting.

Discussion Next Steps

We've solved the immediate problem, but how do we deal with the larger problem? We seem to have an insider or an access control issue. We also need to figure out what the attacker did to devices on our physical security network?




Poll / Discussion

What order would you do the following steps?

This is the correct order.

- 1. Power down Rasp Pi and remove the SD card
- 2. Deploy Guards
- 3. Alert Anshar Regulator/Police Force/NCSC/Vendor
- 4. Quarantine the network/devices
- 5. Take Forensic Images




- 6. Replace devices with available Spares and Repair/Re-image equipment where no spares are available
- 7. Change Passwords and other configurable security parameters/attributes
- 8. Apply compensatory countermeasures
- 9. Place system back into service

Module 3

Cyber Insider Attacker Actions

In the next module, we'll discuss the same incident from the attacker's perspective.





Module 3 Cyber Insider Attacker Actions

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Topics


We are going to look at both the steps they took before the devices was discovered, but the next steps they intended to take.



Introduction

Bob is an unarmed security guard at the Gula Hospital. He has a large amount of personal debt and is struggling.


John is a member of the group Anshar Dawn, a terrorist group who operates against the government of Anshar. John knows about Bob's work at Gula and his crippling debt.



Information Gathering

What is the most likely motivation for the insider in this description?

- 1. Ideological fanatical conviction
- 2. Financial wants/needs money
- 3. Revenge disgruntled employee or customer
- 4. Ego "look what I am smart enough to do"
- 5. Coercion family or self threatened
- 6. Psychological- based on predisposition or stress




Information Gathering

John the Terrorist gathers information about the Gula Hospital, some of it by walking around and inside the facility, some opensource intelligence, and talking with Bob the guard.

He learns that Gula has a:

- Guest Network
- Wired and wireless networks for hospital staff
- An isolated network for the physical protection system.



Negotiations

John offers help for Bob's financial problems. John will give Bob money in exchange for Bob putting a small, credit card sized computer in a physical security equipment closet. Bob decides he can do it with a low probability of getting caught. Bob and John talk about the details of their plan, both logistical and technical.



Bridging Gula Hospital's Networks

Some time when he's alone, Bob goes to the central alarm station, and uses his keys to open the equipment closet and installs the small, credit card sized computer and hooks it up to the physical security network and power.

John has pre-configured the device to connect wirelessly to the Guest network and bridge it and the wired physical protection system network. It provides a clandestine command

Bridging Gula Hospital's Networks

- Bob uses his security keys to open the equipment closet and install the credit card size computer and hook it up to the physical security network and power
- John has pre-configured it to bridge the Guest and Physical Protection System network, and provide clandestine command and control connections from anywhere on internet






and control path from anywhere on the internet to the physical security network.

Network Access

John uses this access to look for what kind of devices are used on the physical protection network at Gula. He then looks for vulnerabilities in those devices.

Those vulnerabilities give him additional access and allows him to exfiltrate sensitive information about physical security at Gula. He can also control many of the devices.

His plan is to at the right time disable to




physical protection system and simultaneously have a group break into Gula and steak the large Cesium-137 source in a blood irradiator.

Result of the PPS Network Attack

Before the attack, John new a lot of information about the physical security at Gula. He identified key devices and computers on the physical security network, like cameras and alarm equipment. He also knows firmware and software versions.

He was able to identify key personnel, contractors and service providers that have access to the secure room and regularly perform work on-site.




He was able to exfiltrate the site security plan, which included security measures, procedures, and response plans.

Module 4

Prevention and Protection

In this module we will discuss how to prevent and protect against an insider attack.



Cyber Insider Training for Radiological Sources

Module 4 Prevention and Protection

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Topics


We'll start this module with talking about the differences between preventative and protective measures. We will then discuss the different types of controls we can implement. This includes technical, administrative, and physical controls.



Preventative and Protective Measures

This is IAEA's preventative and protective measures for the insider.

Findings from the cyber sabotage closely parallel pre-attack behavior in cases of workplace violence, thus the need for disciplines to work together: cyber, physical security, HR and employee assistance or mental health.



Insiders who sabotage or exploit information systems don't just snap. Before major incidents, they follow a pathway of planning and research. They engage in troubling behavior that is observable – online and in person – and that alarms co-workers and friends. In some cases, they tell others explicitly about the malicious insider activity they are planning. This finding illustrates that information about potential insider threats may be known to physical security personnel, or cybersecurity personnel, or both before harm occurs – thus underscoring the need for these departments to share information to prevent insider sabotage.

Across these cases, some pre-incident information was observable within the insiders' online behavior, while other pre-incident behavior was observable in the insiders' offline or in-person behavior.

When security professionals determine that someone is on a "pathway to violence" or is planning cyber damage to the organization, they can try to determine what is driving that behavior.


Sometimes connecting a stressed employee to mental counselling, financial counselling, or changing supervisors or departments, can be all that is needed to defuse hostilities and mitigate risk.

Resource:

SEI/US Secret Service report: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=7227

Technical Controls


They key with any technical controls is have well defined roles and responsibilities and looking at the data you are generating. For instance, we need to limit access and administrator privileges to only what each employee needs to do their assignment. We need to implement robust identification and authentication of users on our systems. We should also implement encryption and network switches to keep network traffic safe from



snooping. We should also install firewalls and data diodes to enforce network separation and boundary protection. Finally, we need to collect computer events and auditing to flag suspicious activity. We should also implement intrusion detection tools to look for anomalous behaviour. Of course, if we don't regularly look at these events, audits, and intrusions, they aren't effective.

Administrative Controls


We can also implement administrative controls. Vetting worker's background is critical, especially those with elevated access. We can segregate duties to ensure that one person can't compromise the system by himself. We need clear policies on what actions are allowed or disallowed with clear consequences. Clear guidance on how access is removed when employees leave an organization, both under good and bad



situations. Finally, we need proper training of all employees on the cyber insider threat, company policies, detecting abnormal behaviour and to respond to cyber events.

Physical Controls

Finally, physical security can enhance our ability to combat the cyber insider. Only employees with an appropriate job function should be allowed physical access to computer systems. This may be controls at the site level (like badges and access control systems) and at lower levels (access control for computer rooms or individual racks of equipment). We should prevent employees from making covert changes to the networks or computer systems.



Assumptions

It is important to remember some things about insiders.

- Every organization can have an insider threat. They can be minor or very serious.
- We can't solve the problem with just background checks. These checks need to be done both pre-employment

Assumptions

- · Unwitting insiders will happen
- · Serious insider problems are possible in your organization
- Background checks are not the only solution
- Red flags will be missed or not acted on
- Security rules aren't always followed
- Insider conspiracies are possible
- Organizational culture and employee disgruntlement matters
 Insiders will know about security measures and how to work around them

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You will need multiple protection measures

Don't focus on just Prevention and miss opportunities for Mitigation

and periodically. Some indicators of an insider threat can't be detected by a background check or can happen between periodic checks.


- Red flags of an insider will sometimes be missed or downplayed.
- Security rules and procedures won't always be followed. This makes the insider's job easier.
- It is possible for insiders to conspire with each other.
- The culture of an organization and the relative happiness of the employees is an important factor.
- Remember that insiders often know the facility's security measures, so they can work around them.
- We need to use multiple layers of defense to prevent and protect against an insider threat.
- Finally, we need to also mitigate the insider threat.

Resource:

A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes, Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan, https://www.amacad.org/publication/worst-practices-guide-insider-threats-lessons-past-mistakes/section/2

Conclusions

There are many similarities between insiders and cyber insiders, but there are also key differences. The differences include the ability to affect multiple disciplines with computer access, and the idea of the Unwitting Insider. We have shown several examples of the cyber insider and described several preventative and protective measures that can assist us. We need a layered defense strategy. Preventative measures can exclude or remove potential



insiders, minimize their opportunity to act. Protective measures are used to detect, delay, respond to, and mitigate malicious acts.

Reference:

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 8, Implementing Guide: Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats

Keeney, Michelle, J.D., Ph.D., Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI May 2005

Discussion

Have an open floor for discussion asking:

- Did your perception of insider threats and how to handle them change?
- What can we do in this environment to do our part?
- What questions do you have?




Contacts

Here we've listed our email addresses.



Auspices



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